

## **Abu Jilda, Anti-Imperial Anti-Hero: Banditry and Popular Rebellion in Palestine**

Abu Jilda entered Ramallah  
And he took their cattle and did not fear Allah.  
Beneath Abu Jilda, a filly, *mashallah*,  
Like December lightning.  
—Palestinian popular song, 1930s<sup>1</sup>

From 1933 to 1934, the administration and public of Palestine were gripped by the exploits of Muhammad Hamad al-Mahmud, better known as Abu Jilda, a highway robber from the village of Tammun, a little over twenty kilometers northeast of Nablus. Abu Jilda began to gain a certain notoriety in the spring of 1933, after he and his band of men undertook a series of highway robberies. However, he achieved real fame in Palestine after he shot and killed an Arab policeman, Husayn al-`Assali, spurring an intense police hunt. His ability to evade the British authorities was trumpeted in the Arabic-language press and by the time he was captured in spring of 1934, Abu Jilda may have been the most notorious individual in Palestine.<sup>2</sup> He was tried, sentenced to death, and hanged in Jerusalem in August 1934, to great public interest, but his prominence quickly faded, overtaken by the activities of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his followers and the outbreak of the Great Revolt in 1936.

Although largely relegated to a footnote in the history of Palestinian resistance to British and Zionist forces during the Mandate period, the story of Abu Jilda can help to illuminate how the kinds of economic, political, and social changes that characterized Palestine under the British Mandate allowed for the emergence of such a figure. In particular, the economic pressures placed on rural populations, sedentary and nomadic alike, the development of a popular press, and the rising frustration with the Mandate administration created the conditions for outbursts of popular nationalist resistance. Abu Jilda's actions and the varying reactions to them can also help to map the tensions between popular and elite politics within the Palestinian population. Overshadowed

by the 1933 demonstrations against British Mandatory policy in various Palestinian cities in elite-driven narratives and by the outbreak of the 1936–1939 Revolt as the iconic event of popular Palestinian resistance, Abu Jilda’s story provides a window onto the undercurrent of popular discontent and resistance in this crucial period. Before delving into the specifics of Abu Jilda’s exploits, I would like to engage in a brief discussion of banditry, both from a theoretical angle and with regard to its history in Palestine and in the region before Abu Jilda’s rise.

### **Banditry and the Ottoman Empire**

Scholarship on banditry in the last half-century has unquestioningly been influenced by Eric Hobsbawm’s *Primitive Rebels* (1959) and *Bandits* (1969). In these works, Hobsbawm put forward a theory of the “social bandit,” regarded as a criminal by the state and the land-owning class but as a hero by the peasantry, as a manifestation of a sort of primordial peasant consciousness and resistance to exploitation. Striking back against an unjust system, social bandits were tolerated, supported, and admired by peasant societies. Scholars of various regions and periods have since engaged with Hobsbawm’s basic premise to produce a rich literature on the complex relationship between states, societies, law-breaking, and the cultural production that celebrates it.<sup>3</sup>

Some argued that bandits, broadly speaking, did not defend the peasantry against unjust lords and landowners, but instead preyed on the peasantry in self-interest.<sup>4</sup> Bandits were often coopted by elites and put to use to politically repress peasants and other possible challengers to the social order.<sup>5</sup> Further, the myths and ballads that Hobsbawm took as evidence of bandits’ popular appeal among the peasantry were more representative of middle class and elite efforts to rework popular bandit stories into national myths.<sup>6</sup>

A more Foucauldian approach argued that states produced banditry as a category of crime to assert more aggressive and comprehensive central control. Nathan Brown writes of the “banditry crisis” of nineteenth-century Egypt:

The rulers *did* invent banditry. They did not do this in the sense of fabricating events. Robbing and raiding were occurring, but the rulers interpreted these events in a new way. Gangs of thieves, highway robbers, and assorted miscreants found themselves momentarily transformed into celebrities as part of the process by which Egypt’s rulers built a more extensive security apparatus.<sup>7</sup>

In a similar vein, Muhsin Soyudoğan argues:

Because, in the definition of banditry, the identity of the actor is as important as the nature of the act, there must be a process through which an actor is given the identity of ‘bandit.’ In this process, becoming a fugitive by escaping from or resisting justice is as important as the commission of the crime itself. It is then, as the criminals becoming a fugitive, that an anti-bandit discourse ascribes banditry to the identity of the one who resists. . . . what we see as banditry is in reality nothing but a discourse.<sup>8</sup>

Soyudoğan does not, however, ascribe to the state a monopoly in mobilizing this discourse.<sup>9</sup>

The Ottoman Empire has a long history of coopting bandits.<sup>10</sup> Yet Soyudoğan also makes clear that “there was always small-scale banditry” that disrupted the Ottoman order.<sup>11</sup> In late Ottoman Palestine, evidence points to the coincidence of efforts to coopt brigands as well as the prevalence of small-scale banditry in the Palestinian countryside. James Finn, the British Consul in Jerusalem from 1846 to 1863, wrote of Khalil Agha al-Rassas, Jerusalem’s police chief:

“Chief of the police as he was, he had been in league with all the well-known desperadoes inside and outside of the cities.”<sup>12</sup> But Finn also wrote:

The causes or aims of peasant warfare . . . have in Palestine seldom or never any connection with government dealing. They arise either from lust of power among the Shaikhs, or hereditary feuds, or from vindictive retaliation. On the latter score a pretty quarrel may be got up at any time; but Wat Tylers or Massaniellos are unknown here.<sup>13</sup>

Although Finn's assessment of peasant disputes may reflect an Orientalist depoliticization of Arab society, it may also be indicative of Soyudoğan's argument that conflict and resistance as expressed in various forms of "criminality" by rural populations is not only and always about class warfare or resisting authority.

Nadir Özbek's study of the Ottoman gendarmerie in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries indicates the continuing problem that rural crime, especially banditry, played in the eyes of the Ottoman state. Formed to pacify the countryside, the gendarmerie was frequently used as a means of coopting brigands. Given the Ottoman government's difficulties in paying gendarmes' salaries on time, it was not unusual for gendarmes to take to brigandage, often alienating peasants whom these gendarmes extorted.<sup>14</sup> Jaffa-based newspaper *Filastin's* reporting in the late Ottoman period gives voice to the perception that gendarmes themselves became part of the problem to which they were supposed to have been the solution. On 19 July 1911, *Filastin* hailed the arrival in Jaffa of a force of gendarmes from Beirut: "We have no doubt that, with regard to bandits, [the gendarmes] will disrupt their ambitions."<sup>15</sup> By the end of September, however, the newspaper changed its tune:

We saw the most defiant bandits evading them and escaping them, to the extent that [the gendarmes] are complicit in their evil deeds. Over the past six months, the influence of the gendarmerie has dissipated until it has now become nonexistent. As a result, we see repeated incidents, bandits roaming freely, and rogues doing as they please. The city is anxious, the people are fearful, and business is in a recession.<sup>16</sup>

With the onset of World War I and the introduction of British Mandatory rule in Palestine, dynamics that had encouraged banditry in Ottoman Palestine were complemented by new factors. Understanding the milieu from which Abu Jilda emerged can shed light on the shifting context and character of banditry in post-war Palestine.

## Abu Jilda's Social Origins

Abu Jilda was born in either in 1897 or 1898<sup>17</sup> and thus would have come of age during World War I in Palestine, when the displacement and death that the war brought with it were accompanied by famine and disease with devastating impact.<sup>18</sup> In the decades that followed, Palestinians struggled to recover from the suffering of the war years. British economic policies in Palestine did little to support the Palestinian sector, especially in rural areas, while its support of Jewish immigration put further pressure on rural Palestinians.<sup>19</sup> Drought, cattle plague, and foot and mouth disease—all of which afflicted Palestine in the 1920s—would have been especially damaging to rural economies like those of Tammun, which was characterized by a hybrid of nomadic and settled agricultural life.<sup>20</sup> The Palestinian economy was thus already vulnerable at the outbreak of the Great Depression, when rural debts and interest rates as high as 200 percent forced many Palestinians off their lands, which they lost to foreclosure.<sup>21</sup>

*Al-Karmil*, one of the Arabic-language newspapers most critical of Abu Jilda, clearly linked the economic conditions of Palestine, Britain's support for the Zionist project, and Abu Jilda's activities:

The English Zionist policy opened the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration from every country in the world and these countries all block their doors in the face of the Arabs. So what do the Arabs do when they are expelled from their lands and their businesses and factories are squeezed and the doors to earning a living are closed in their faces?!

Is it not feared that many of them will become Abu Jildas?

Does the government and the Zionists account for this?!

Despite the funds spent on the pursuit of Abu Jilda, we estimate that there might emerge from among the farmers, if they starve and are blocked from working, thousands like Abu Jilda.<sup>22</sup>

British colonial land policies put even more pressure on pastoralists in Palestine. British administrators saw individually owned private property as the path to economic development and sought to impose a corresponding legal order over Palestinian lands. Lands used for pasturage,

often grazed communally, thus needed to be “improved” through cultivation by individual landowners; British officials did not see pastoralists as holding any rights to this land or its usage.<sup>23</sup> As Paul Sant Cassia points out in his work on Cyprus, similar British colonial policies tended to reduce lands available for pasturage and to marginalize shepherds, “the mainstay of livestock rustling and shady activities in the countryside.”<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the hybrid nomadic-agricultural tradition of the specific region of Abu Jilda’s origins left inhabitants of this milieu well equipped for the lifestyle of highway banditry, which required a kind of nomadic existence and familiarity with the rugged landscape.

In his study of brigandage and the development of the modern Greek nation-state, John Koliopoulos also highlights the importance of the family as political institution among highland pastoralists. The family “settled disputes over resources, punished crimes, protected the honour of its members, and prescribed social behaviour.” This form of social organization, according to Koliopoulos, “favoured also sheep stealing, robbing, and arms bearing.”<sup>25</sup> Not surprisingly, similar values in Palestinians northern hill-country can be discerned in stories explaining Abu Jilda’s turn to a life of crime. As *Filastin* reported in September 1933:

The family of Abu Jilda in Tammun is small in number, and there is a large family there that killed one of Abu Jilda’s family and frequently harassed them. So he incited his relatives to take revenge or to go to another village. They did not do so, and when his means became limited, he took up a rifle and left. . . . When he was outside of the village, he chanced upon three members from that family, so he opened fire on them and they died . . . this was the first crime which the residents of the mountains recalled.<sup>26</sup>

British accounts differs slightly, but they too agree that Abu Jilda’s turn to highway robbery was spurred in part by the conflicts that characterized his relations with his community and how these were embedded in kinship relationships and family-centered notions of justice.<sup>27</sup> In early September 1933, a *Filastin* reporter who attempted to track down Abu Jilda’s family in

Tammun reported: “Upon my arrival, I learned that Abu Jilda’s family and his clan had migrated to the village of Tubas, located fifteen minutes by car from Tammun.”<sup>28</sup> That the members of Abu Jilda’s family and extended family were no longer welcome in Tammun indicates that matters remained unresolved. Tensions persisted and after Abu Jilda’s death sentence was handed down the bad blood between Abu Jilda’s *hamula* and the Bisharat *hamula* threatened the stability of Tammun. The *qa’immaqam* of Nablus intervened, forming a 20-person reconciliation committee to bring the feud to a close.<sup>29</sup> However, less than two weeks later, violent clashes between Abu Jilda’s *hamula* and another *hamula* sent a number of participants to the hospital and required military intervention.<sup>30</sup>

Though we have no definitive account of Abu Jilda’s history and the details of his early criminal activity, the various accounts do offer a social and economic context within which to place his later actions. These conditions conform to those associated with banditry elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The specific aspects of Abu Jilda’s rise to fame, however, may shed light on some of Mandate Palestine’s specificities.

### **The Rise and Fall of Abu Jilda**

A January 1933 article in *Filastin*, the earliest mention of Abu Jilda that I have found, already refers to him as “one of the well-known robbers” in the area around Tammun when describing his theft of three goats and murder of their owner.<sup>31</sup> *Filastin* later commented on Abu Jilda’s long criminal history: at the age of 35, “the number of crimes he has committed is six, the first of which he committed at the age of eighteen and the most recent in the past year, when he committed three crimes in one hour. This does not include the crimes that he has committed recently.”<sup>32</sup> According to the British authorities, Abu Jilda and his band were responsible for nine

“serious crimes” during the course of 1933: “two murders, five highway robberies, one theft with violence, and an attempted highway robbery.”<sup>33</sup> Most notably, the 22 May 1933 killing of the policeman Husayn al-`Assili, a Jerusalemite Palestinian who had served in the police prior to the arrival of the British,<sup>34</sup> prompted intense police pursuit and brought Abu Jilda squarely into the public eye. British Mandate authorities issued a reward of one hundred Palestine pounds to whoever led them to Abu Jilda, and rewards of fifty Palestine pounds each for Abu Jilda’s lieutenants Mahmud Muhammad Abu Dawla and Salih Ahmad Mustafa alias al-`Armit. The newspaper *Mir’at al-Sharq* commented: “this is the first time to our knowledge that the government has designated a reward for the murder of an Arab.”<sup>35</sup>

On 5 August 1933, another Palestinian policeman was murdered in the Nablus region by a gang purporting to be Abu Jilda’s.<sup>36</sup> In September 1933, Palestinian police captain Ibrahim Bek Istanbuli noted that sightings of Abu Jilda’s gang were reported more than ten times daily in various locations, which he felt was an indication of other thieves claiming to be Abu Jilda’s men, as well as the degree to which Abu Jilda’s gang had terrorized the people.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, almost any act of highway robbery in Palestine in this period raised the question of Abu Jilda’s involvement. Rumors of Abu Jilda’s gang’s escape into Lebanon or Syria to avoid capture were both confirmed and denied by police and the press.<sup>38</sup>

On 26 September 1933, the police achieved their first major victory in their ongoing pursuit of Abu Jilda and his band when Abu Dawla surrendered to the police. High-ranking police officials immediately rushed to interview him.<sup>39</sup> While observers speculated as to the reasons behind Abu Dawla’s defection,<sup>40</sup> it seems that family ties and self-interest were key factors. Mandate authorities pressured Abu Dawla’s relatives to negotiate his surrender and were



prepared to offer a plea deal in exchange for information and evidence against Abu Jilda and al-`Armit.<sup>41</sup>

October's news was dominated by clashes between Palestinians protestors and the British authorities. On 13 October 1933, police forcibly dispersed a large demonstration in Jerusalem against British policy in Palestine led by the Arab Executive Committee. Two weeks later, a follow-up demonstration in Jaffa was met by police violence and devolved into rioting, news of which prompted demonstrations and unrest in Haifa, Nablus, and Jerusalem in the evening of 27 October and the following days.<sup>42</sup> The Arabic-language press reacted strongly, condemning the behavior of the police against the demonstrators. Yet Abu Jilda was not completely displaced from the headlines. *Filastin* continued to produce the latest reports on the whereabouts and activities of Abu Jilda and his gang, while *Mir'at al-Sharq* argued that the government's attention to the demonstrations had given the gang the opportunity to go to ground: "The latest talk is that they were a great boon to Abu Jilda and his gang, paving the way for them to escape and disappear. Bravo, Abu Jilda!"<sup>43</sup>

By mid-December, British authorities increased the reward for the gang's capture, with the newspaper *Filastin* offering up an additional 50 pounds "in order to relieve the people of the evil of this gang and to augment the large amounts of money that the government has spent from the country's wealth on the futile chase so that it may spend it to relieve the brunt of the crisis that has spread far and wide in the country and especially among the villagers."<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile, the police replaced the officer in charge of Abu Jilda's pursuit.<sup>45</sup> For about a month, few incidents were attributed to Abu Jilda's gang. The increased pressure from the British authorities likely played a part, though the press speculated that the gang's inactivity was the result of al-`Armit's having fallen ill<sup>46</sup> and Abu Jilda himself claimed in a letter to *Filastin* that the gang had been

quiet to respect the holy month of Ramadan: “Let the government of Britain know that I and the members of my gang withdrew to the hills because we are a community of gangs who have *haram* months, during which it is forbidden for us to steal, pillage, kill and the like.”<sup>47</sup>

Abu Jilda trumpeted his return by sending a series of photos to *Filastin*, which it published on its front page on 28 January 1934. This drew police attention to the newspaper’s editors, its Nablus correspondent, and a Nablus photographer, and prompted authorities to increase the reward for Abu Jilda’s capture to 250 Palestine pounds.<sup>48</sup> February and March 1934 brought more robberies and rumors, and a running commentary by Palestinian newspapers on the various failed attempts by the police to apprehend the bandits as Abu Jilda’s notoriety seemed only to increase.

On 13 April 1934, the police finally captured Abu Jilda and al-`Armit, though the manner of their capture is a matter of some dispute. Jack Binsley, a British policeman present at the capture, writes that local informants had led policemen to the area where the two bandits were hiding in a cave, and a brief firefight ensued. Police surrounded the cave and “eventually a near relative of El Armeet was brought from his village to persuade them to come out of the cave.”<sup>49</sup> *Filastin* published a sensationalist account tracing Abu Jilda’s capture to his carelessness involvement in a romantic tryst that ultimately led to his discovery by police.<sup>50</sup> Najati Sidqi, a Palestinian communist who was imprisoned with Abu Jilda and al-`Armit, wrote in his diary: “When the British closed in on the guerrilla band, its members scattered here and there. Abu Jildah fled to Amman and asked for the protection of Amir Abdallah, who received him and listened to his story. But the result was negative, as Abdallah handed him over to the British authorities, who transferred him to Jerusalem’s central prison.”<sup>51</sup> Whatever the case, authorities

had captured the man whose ability to elude justice had been a major source of embarrassment for the better part of the previous year.

Abu Jilda and al-`Armit were imprisoned and put on trial for highway robbery and murder. They were represented in court by Hasan Sidqi Bek al-Dajani, a journalist, lawyer, and politician from a prominent family who defended them pro bono. Dajani's defense rested primarily on two aspects: a legalistic examination of the law under which they were charged and its applicability to the specific crimes in question; and questioning the reliability of the eyewitness testimony, particularly that of Abu Dawla, the state's key witness.<sup>52</sup> Neither was successful. Abu Jilda and al-`Armit were sentenced to death and their appeals denied.

Palestinian press coverage of Abu Jilda's and al-`Armit's sentencing and execution largely valorized them. As their final appeal was rejected and their death sentences confirmed, *al-Difa`* commented on the coolness with which the two received the news: "they were stoic and uninterested in it, though we saw a smile spread on their faces when they heard the decision."<sup>53</sup> By *Filastin's* account, after the death sentence was affirmed Abu Jilda and al-`Armit were greeted outside the courthouse by throngs of onlookers who applauded them and to whom the two dramatically bid farewell.<sup>54</sup> The Communist Party urged the Palestinian youth to rise up and free them from prison,<sup>55</sup> but no such jailbreak occurred and the two were executed on 21 August 1934. Neither of the men's bodies was buried in their respective home villages of Tammun and Bayta, perhaps an indication of continued family disputes and tensions regarding the men's crimes before and during their high-profile escapades. Abu Jilda was buried in Tubas, where his family had sought refuge, and al-`Armit's body was laid to rest in the Nablus cemetery. *Al-Difa`* reported that their bodies

were accompanied by a large group of their relatives. . . . A large audience of relatives and people from the neighboring villages proceeded in the funeral of

Salih al-`Armit. The public security directorate sent a large force of soldiers to Tammun and Bayta to maintain public security. And what draws one's attention is that sadness hung over the city today.<sup>56</sup>

Thus Abu Jilda was given a hero's send-off, at least in the pages of the Arabic-language press.<sup>57</sup>

A closer examination of his valorization can shed light on popular Palestinian nationalism on the cusp of the Great Revolt.

### **Abu Jilda and Popular Nationalism in Palestine**

Much scholarship on the Middle East in the twentieth century has been devoted to the question of nationalism, whether on a regional or at the nation-state level. More recently, elite-driven narratives of nationalism have given way to studies that emphasize the dynamic relationship between rural and urban nationalism and popular and elite nationalism.<sup>58</sup> For Mandate Palestine, the 1936–1939 Revolt is an iconic moment during which these various nationalisms within Palestine manifested themselves in heightened form.

The Revolt's success in rallying broad support was, in part, the product of an alliance between three categories of leadership. These different elements included: (1) political elites such as the members of the Arab Higher Committee and Fawzi al-Qawuqji; (2) popular religious leaders such as Shaykh `Izz al-Din al-Qassam and Shaykh Farhan al-Sa`di; and (3) leaders of armed bands such as Yusuf Sa`id Abu Durra, `Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad, `Arif `Abd al-Raziq, and Fakhri `Abd al-Hadi. Any meaningful genealogy of this third component should, without endorsing the British characterization of all rebels during the Revolt as bandits and gangsters, take into account not only peasant discontent and dispossession, but also the local histories of banditry, agricultural crime, family disputes, and so on.<sup>59</sup> Through Abu Jilda, it is

possible to see how these local factors became intertwined with national politics and to explore some of the unavoidable tensions that resulted.

The relationship between Abu Jilda and Hasan Sidqi Bek al-Dajani is one lens through which to view the uneasy confluence of popular and elite nationalisms in Palestine. Before defending Abu Jilda and al-`Armit, Dajani had only recently resigned from the secretariat of the Palestinian Umma Party, established to serve the “Islamic community in Palestine” and opposed to Jewish immigration to Palestine, land sales, and British colonialism.<sup>60</sup> Later, Dajani was arrested for his leadership role in the general strike that preceded the Revolt and during the Revolt he channeled funds to the rebels and is said to have maintained a close relationship with one of the Revolt’s military leaders, `Arif `Abd al-Raziq.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, Dajani was frequently accused of cozying up to Zionists and his personal ambition was said to motivate him more than any ideal.<sup>62</sup> Dajani’s murky political attachments and sympathies are perhaps reflective of Abu Jilda’s own indeterminate position; Palestinian nationalism, opposition to Zionism, and opposition to British rule were all open to a certain negotiation and were contested by actors within the Palestinian sphere, intermingling with personal interests and sympathies tied to socioeconomic position.

Meanwhile, the tension between these various strains of resistance to British Mandate rule played out in the Palestinian press, which both valorized Abu Jilda and criticized him for failing to articulate a clear political vision. In April 1934, after the capture of Abu Jilda and al-`Armit, *al-Difa`* stated definitively: “Abu Jilda did not kindle a political movement or a general nationalist trend. . . . Would that Abu Jilda had any connection to a view or a thought or a doctrine . . . But it is unknown whether he is influenced by nationalist thought, so the nation’s preoccupation with him is a waste of time.”<sup>63</sup> Around the same time, *al-Jami`a al-`Arabiyya*

dismissed Abu Jilda as “the hero of an episode that has been concluded.”<sup>64</sup> In July 1934, *Filastin* wrote: “The people of Palestine admired him and exaggerated mention of his actions. But this was only because they were fed up with this government, and Abu Jilda’s challenge to the government was the source of the admiration for him.”<sup>65</sup>

The newspapers also criticized their competitors for irresponsibly fêting Abu Jilda. Among the most vociferous of these critiques was an attack directed by *al-Karmil* in November 1934 against *al-Difa`* for publishing a poem in which Abu Jilda was referred to as a “prophet” who “rebelled to purchase, with blood, dignity for your people and most dear and honored independence.” The editors of *al-Karmil* wrote:

We forgive the poet . . . for his poem because he gathered his information about Abu Jilda from the daily newspapers. But we do not forgive our esteemed colleagues *al-Difa`* for publishing the likes of this poem, because they know the truth about Abu Jilda. They know the reason he fled into the wilderness. They know that he did not undertake any nationalist acts and they know how he surrendered himself. Do our respected colleagues want . . . to take Abu Jilda as a more exalted example to have praises lavished upon than the heroes of nationalism? . . . This is one of the reasons that the English and the Zionists mock us and decrease the value of nationalism in the view of the people.<sup>66</sup>

Notably these criticisms came only after Abu Jilda’s capture. During his year on the lam the press attributed to him qualities connected to articulations of popular nationalism. Primary among these are values of honor, justice, and piety. In a critique of British police violence during the October 1933 demonstrations, *Filastin* implicitly contrasted the police’s cowardice with Abu Jilda’s bravery and honor: “In 1933, Abu Jilda appeared, bugbear of the proven, feared police. He attacked and moved about freely . . . and picked a fight . . . and cried out, Is there a worthy adversary . . . and the worthy adversary busied itself with peaceful Arabs . . . and handed out blows and slaughter.”<sup>67</sup>

In addition to presenting a challenge to the British, Abu Jilda's relationship with his fellow Palestinians can be read as reflecting certain popular nationalist values. In these stories, Abu Jilda exhibits contempt for government service, especially in the security forces. At the same time, though willing to kill those who worked too closely with the British, Abu Jilda also showed mercy to his fellow Palestinians. For example, the policeman Mahmud Isma`il, who was witness to the murder of Husayn al-`Assili, claimed that Abu Jilda asked him:

where are you from? I replied, From Hebron, so he said to me, You are from the land of dignity and honor and you come to serve this infidel government. Abu Jilda wanted to kill this policeman, too, but let him go on condition that he swear on all that is holy to leave government service.<sup>68</sup>

Similarly, *Filastin* described Abu Jilda's discovery of two Palestinian undercover policemen who were tried in Abu Jilda's "court" and sentenced to death. After promising to stop working with the government, the two were allowed to leave unharmed.<sup>69</sup>

In other stories, Abu Jilda was said to hate lying and to be generous with those who were honest.<sup>70</sup> He also sought to craft a self-image of piety, claiming to fast and refrain from crime during Ramadan.<sup>71</sup> Meanwhile, Abu Jilda was described as disdainful of Palestinians overly concerned with wealth. A January 1934 report foreshadowed a tactic of rebels during the 1936–1939 Revolt, as Abu Jilda's gang entered the home of a rich Palestinian and ordered him to contribute 50 Palestine pounds to the cause or face death. When the man swore that he did not have the sum in his home, Abu Jilda granted him a reprieve, promising to return at a later date.<sup>72</sup> Interestingly, in an account by which Abu Jilda intervened on behalf of a young man who had hoped to marry his cousin but whose uncle had chosen another groom for his daughter on account of his wealth, *Mir'at al-Sharq* described his authority in the villages as Abu Jilda's "state" (*dawlat Abi Jilda*).<sup>73</sup> Though partially ironic, such language gives voice to alternative

values of governance, putting forward a positive vision of popular nationalism that goes beyond its purely oppositional mode of anti-colonialism.

It is certainly problematic to proclaim definitively on popular nationalism based on material culled from the press. The press has been used to both theorize nationalism and to seek evidence of its emergence, in Palestine no less than elsewhere, but those who owned newspapers, wrote for them, and read them were for the most part from the elite and middle class.<sup>74</sup> By the 1930s, however, Arabic-language newspapers were an increasing part of Palestinian public life, and Abu Jilda's story also gives an indication of how this involved the popular classes as well. The various Palestinian newspapers' decision to publish news and rumors of Abu Jilda's gang was presumably an effort to draw in a wider and more popular audience, and it met with no small success.<sup>75</sup> The publication of poetry and songs written in colloquial Arabic and of photographs of Abu Jilda and his gang would likely have circulated more widely among popular and even illiterate sectors of Palestinian society.<sup>76</sup> Abu Jilda himself recognized the impact of the press among Palestine's popular classes and sent dispatches and photographs to *Filastin*. The relationship between Abu Jilda and the Palestinian press was thus reciprocal: the press used him to boost sales and to reach a broader audience, while he instrumentalized his notoriety to gain access to a forum that would otherwise be denied to a Palestinian of his social background.

In this way, excavating the details of Abu Jilda's activities and his relationship with Palestinian political elites sheds light on the complex interactions between popular and elite strains of nationalism in Palestine in the early 1930s. Though nationalist elites went to great lengths to distance themselves from Abu Jilda after his arrest, there is no question that the Palestinian public appreciated his ability to embarrass the British administration in ways that



politicians could not. It is not surprising that in January 1934, “when the latest demonstrations were held in Jerusalem, they were not without chants to his majesty [Abu Jilda].”<sup>77</sup>

## Conclusion

Abu Jilda may not have been a true “social bandit” in the Hobsbawmian sense, nor a pure “nationalist” in the sense of articulating a clear and coherent vision of Palestinian nationhood. Nor was Abu Jilda completely “invented”—as in Nathan Brown’s conception of Egyptian banditry—by a British Mandate regime that would have been quite satisfied to reduce security expenditures in Palestine. Banditry certainly adapted to new conditions under the Mandate, including both socio-economic shifts and the rising tide of anti-colonial nationalist sentiment. Keeping this in mind, Abu Jilda helps us to make better sense of the relationship between various strains of nationalism in Palestine as they played out on the ground and as they given shape in the press, all in the crucial context of the build-up to the 1936–1939 Revolt.

Though quickly overshadowed by this uprising and remaining marginal in the Palestinian imagination through the 1980s,<sup>78</sup> Abu Jilda’s legend has enjoyed something of a rebirth in recent years. In 2007, Harun Hashim Rashid, a prominent Palestinian poet and author from Gaza and former head of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Cairo, published a fictionalized history of Abu Jilda.<sup>79</sup> In his 2011 memoir, Bishara Bendeck Sarioglu described Abu Jilda as his childhood hero, comparing him to Robin Hood and placing him in the pantheon of heroes with ‘Abd al-Qadr al-Husayni and Fawzi Qawuqji.<sup>80</sup> Palestinian artists Ruanne Abou-Rahme’s and Basel Abbas’s 2012 installation “The Incidental Insurgents” placed photographs of Abu Jilda and al-‘Armit in juxtaposition with images of the French anarchist Bonnot Gang and text from Victor Serge’s *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*.<sup>81</sup> Though I have argued here for Abu Jilda’s usefulness in

thinking about Mandate Palestine's history, the revived interest in his story may also provide some insight into popular nationalism of the present. As elite politics have been discredited and nationalist figures have been drained of some of their potency, the appeal of an "incidental insurgent," of an anti-imperial anti-hero like Abu Jilda, is hardly surprising.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Jamil Husayn al-Salhut and Muhammad Salim Shahada, *Suwwar min al-adab al-sha`bi al-filastini*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Manshurat al-rawwad, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Jaffa-based newspaper *Filastin* headlined an article on American gangster John Dillinger "The American Abu Jilda." *Filastin*, 3 June 1934, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of the debates sparked by Hobsbawm's work, see Richard Slatta, "Eric J. Hobsbawm's Social Bandit: A Critique and Revision," *A Contracorriente* 1, no. 2 (Spring 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Anton Blok, "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14, no. 4 (1972), pp. 494–503.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–1912* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> Blok, "The Peasant and the Brigand," p. 500; for a more developed look at the interplay between bandit myths and nationalism, see: Tomas Balkelis, "Social Banditry and Nation-Making: The Myth of a Lithuanian Robber," *Past and Present* 198 (February 2008), pp. 111–145.

<sup>7</sup> Nathan Brown, "Brigands and State Building: The Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 2 (April 1990), p. 268.

<sup>8</sup> Muhsin Soyudoğan, "Discourse, Identity, and Tribal Banditry: A Case Study on Ottoman Ayntâb," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 17, no. 1–2 (2011), p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> In an effort to get away from stable categories of "social" and "political" banditry, he emphasizes banditry as an inter-group phenomenon: "we do not look for banditry in a society that is universally peasant; we look for it in a society divided along ethnic, socio-cultural, religious, economic, fraternal, and professional lines." Soyudoğan, "Discourse, Identity, and Tribal Banditry," p. 72.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example: Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Dennis N. Skiotis, "From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750–1784," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, no. 3 (July 1971), pp. 219–244.

<sup>11</sup> Soyudoğan, "Discourse, Identity, and Tribal Banditry," p. 65.

<sup>12</sup> James Finn, *Stirring Times or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856*, ed. E. A. Finn, vol. 1 (London: C. Kegan Paul, 1878), p. 475.

<sup>13</sup> Finn, *Stirring Times*, p. 243. Wat Tyler led a peasant revolt against the poll tax in England in 1381. The Italian fisherman and smuggler Tommaso Aniello, known as Masaniello, led a 1647 uprising against Habsburg rule in Naples.

<sup>14</sup> Nadir Özbek, “Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Ottoman Empire (1876–1908),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008), pp. 47–67, especially pp. 56, 58.

<sup>15</sup> “The New Gendarmerie,” *Filastin*, 19 July 1911, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> “Regarding the New Gendarmerie,” *Filastin*, 30 September 1911, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> “Abu Jilda’s Characteristics,” *Filastin*, 6 September 1933, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> For a discussion of the impact on the region, see Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, “The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria,” in John P. Spagnolo, ed., *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honor of Albert Hourani* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1992), pp. 229–258. For a first-hand account from Palestine, see Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of Palestine’s Ottoman Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). See also: “An Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine during the Period 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1920–30<sup>th</sup> June, 1921” (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1921), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> On the uneven impact of British economic policies in Palestine, see: Amos Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy under the Mandate: A Story of Colonial Bungling* (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2006); Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920–1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993).

<sup>20</sup> Beshara Doumani writes of villages in this area of Jabal Nablus, including Tammun: “many peasants left their homes for long periods of time as they led their livestock through the surrounding grazing land.” Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 30. Of Tubas, the village to which Abu Jilda’s family moved after he went on the lam, Doumani writes: “Similarly, the inhabitants of the largest village in northeast Jabal Nablus, Tubas, spent much of their time every year living in tents in order to work on their distant lands and to graze their flocks of sheep and goats.” Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, p. 270.

<sup>21</sup> James L. Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 105.

<sup>22</sup> “Abu Jilda: The Fear of Many Abu Jildas,” *al-Karmil*, 27 September 1933, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>23</sup> On British land policies in Palestine, see Martin Bunton, *Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917–1936* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>24</sup> Paul Sant Cassia, “Banditry, Myth, and Terror in Cyprus and Other Mediterranean Societies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35, no. 4 (Oct. 1993), p. 780.

<sup>25</sup> Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause*, pp. 25–26.

<sup>26</sup> “How Abu Jilda Formed His Gang,” *Filastin*, 7 September 1933, p. 5.

<sup>27</sup> According to the British administration report to the League of Nations, Abu Jilda “murdered three of his relatives whose sheep he had stolen and who had aroused his hatred by informing against him. He immediately absconded and formed a gang of three highwaymen.” “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1933” [hereafter “League of Nations Report, 1933”] (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1934), p. 80. British policeman Jack Binsley, meanwhile, claims that Abu Jilda “had been a hard working fellah but after a quarrel over land inheritance he murdered his brother and henceforth was on the run and lived by banditry for many months.” Jack Binsley, “The Capture of Abu Jildi,” *Palestine Police Old Comrades Association Newsletter* 103 (June 1976), p. 44.

<sup>28</sup> “To Abu Jilda’s Village,” *Filastin*, 6 September 1933, p. 4.

- <sup>29</sup> “After Abu Jilda,” *Filastin*, 17 July 1934, p. 7.
- <sup>30</sup> “Bloody Brawl because of Abu Jilda,” *Filastin*, 29 July 1934, p. 9.
- <sup>31</sup> “Thief and Murderer,” *Filastin*, 26 January 1933, p. 8.
- <sup>32</sup> “Abu Jilda’s Characteristics,” *Filastin*, 6 September 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>33</sup> “League of Nations Report, 1933,” p. 80.
- <sup>34</sup> ‘Assali features in Lars (Lewis) Larsson’s iconic photograph of the “surrender” of Jerusalem to the British on 9 December 1917. See Issam Nassar, “Photography as Source Material for Jerusalem’s Social History,” in Camille Mansour and Leila Fawaz, eds., *Transformed Landscapes: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East in Honor of Walid Khalidi* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009), pp. 155–56.
- <sup>35</sup> “Murder of al-‘Assili,” *Mir‘at al-Sharq*, 27 May 1933, p. 3.
- <sup>36</sup> “Another Policeman Murdered,” *Mir‘at al-Sharq*, 5 August 1933, p. 5.
- <sup>37</sup> “Abu Jilda Is Everywhere!” *Filastin*, 8 September 1933.
- <sup>38</sup> On 17 September 1933, *Filastin* reported that, despite rumors that Abu Jilda’s gang had fled to Syria to avoid capture, they were “still wreaking havoc in the country.” “Abu Jilda Is Still in Palestine,” *Filastin*, 17 September 1933, p. 6. On 21 September 1933, *Filastin* reported that while the Palestine Police claimed that Abu Jilda and his band were in the Jenin area, there were also rumors of their presence along the Lebanese border and that the British Mandatory authorities were working with the French authorities in Lebanon to try to apprehend members of the band. “Abu Jilda Is Everywhere: In Palestine, in Lebanon?! . . .” and “Palestinian and Lebanese Authorities Cooperate,” *Filastin*, 21 September 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>39</sup> “Muhammad Abu Dawla, Colleague of Abu Jilda, Surrenders Himself to the Police in Qalqiliya,” *Filastin*, 27 September 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>40</sup> “Why Did He Surrender Himself?” *Filastin*, 27 September 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>41</sup> *Filastin* reported that negotiations between Abu Dawla and the police, mediated by the *mukhtar* of the locality of Shuraym, in Qalqiliya, had been ongoing for approximately a month and a half. The *mukhtar*, Bakr Mustafa, was a relative of Abu Dawla’s. “Abu Dawla’s Dispute with Abu Jilda,” *Filastin*, 29 September 1933, p. 3.
- <sup>42</sup> For the official British report on these events, see: “Report of the Commission Appointed by His Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine by Notification No. 1561 Published in the Palestine Gazette Dated 16<sup>th</sup> November, 1933,” *Palestine Gazette* 420 (7 Feb. 1934), pp. 87–105.
- <sup>43</sup> “Abu Jilda, Whereabouts Unkown!” *Mir‘at al-Sharq*, 11 November 1933, p. 2.
- <sup>44</sup> “Reward for Whoever Captures Abu Jilda and al-‘Armit” and “*Filastin* Newspaper Also Puts Up 50 Pounds Reward,” *Filastin*, 14 December 1933, p. 8. *Filastin* claimed that the reward had been increased to 350 Palestine pounds, but given the announcement in late January that the reward had increased to 250 Palestine pounds, this figure seems incorrect.
- <sup>45</sup> “New Leader of Hunt for Abu Jilda’s Gang,” *al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya*, 15 December 1933, p. 5.
- <sup>46</sup> “Abu Jilda’s ‘Secretary’ Sick . . .,” *Filastin*, 29 December 1933, p. 5; “al-‘Armit’s Illness Gets Worse,” *al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya*, 29 December 1933, p. 8.
- <sup>47</sup> “Abu Jilda and His Gang’s Withdrawal in the Mountains,” *Filastin*, 24 January 1934, p. 1.
- <sup>48</sup> “Abu Jilda’s Gift of Pictures to *Filastin* Piques the Interest of the Public Security Department,” *Filastin*, 31 January 1934, p. 5; “Cash Reward for Whoever Apprehends Abu Jilda!” *al-Jami‘a al-‘Arabiyya*, 31 January 1934, p. 5.
- <sup>49</sup> Binsley, “Capture of Abu Jildi,” p. 45.
- <sup>50</sup> “Abu Jilda’s Passion Leads Him to the Gallows,” *Filastin*, 29 July 1934, p. 11.

- <sup>51</sup> Sidqi as quoted in Salim Tamari, “Najati Sidqi (1905–79): The Enigmatic Jerusalem Bolshevik,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003), p. 93.
- <sup>52</sup> *Filastin* ran the text of Dajani’s defense of Abu Jilda in installments on 6 and 7 July 1934; *al-Difa`* published al-`Armit’s defense in eight parts on 29–31 July, 1–2 August, and 5–7 August 1934.
- <sup>53</sup> “Death Sentence Confirmed for Abu Jilda and al-`Armit,” *al-Difa`*, 25 July 1934, p. 5.
- <sup>54</sup> “Death Sentence Affirmed for Abu Jilda and al-`Armit: Onlookers Applaud the Convicted—Abu Jilda Bids Farewell,” *Filastin*, 25 July 1934, p. 5.
- <sup>55</sup> “Communist Publications Urge the Rescue of Abu Jilda,” *al-Difa`*, 22 August 1934, p. 5.
- <sup>56</sup> “The Burial of Abu Jilda and al-`Armit and the Sadness of the Neighboring Villages,” *al-Difa`*, 22 August 1945, p. 5.
- <sup>57</sup> In contrast, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency wrote: “One of the interesting features of the trial was the rather surprising absence of public interest in it. Only a small crowd of the brigand’s former hero-worshippers—there as if by accident—were on hand to witness the proceedings and to see the desperadoes led off in chains after their conviction.” See “Jilda, ‘Dillinger of the Desert,’ Erred Fatally: He Stayed Caught,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 18 July 1934.
- <sup>58</sup> See, for example: James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
- <sup>59</sup> For a Syrian parallel, see Gelvin’s account of the Higher National Committee’s ability to coopt armed bands of *chete* and individuals’ varying motivations for joining armed bands: Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, pp. 121–22, 124.
- <sup>60</sup> “The Resignation of Hasan Sidqi Bek al-Dajani from the Secretariat of the Palestinian Umma Party,” *Filastin*, 30 September 1933, p. 4.
- <sup>61</sup> Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 130.
- <sup>62</sup> See Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 187–191; Cohen, *Army of Shadows*, pp. 130–131; Muhammad `Izzat Darwaza, *Mudhakkirat Muhammad `Izzat Darwaza, 1305 h.–1404 h./1887 m.–1984 m.* (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 340–41.
- <sup>63</sup> “Abu Jilda!” *al-Difa`*, 20 April 1934, p. 1.
- <sup>64</sup> *Al-Jami`a al-`Arabiyya*, 15 April 1934, as quoted in Kabha, *Palestinian Press*, p. 100.
- <sup>65</sup> “Abu Jilda’s Passion Leads Him to the Gallows,” *Filastin*, 29 July 1934, p. 11.
- <sup>66</sup> “Abu Jilda,” *al-Karmil*, 18 November 1934, p. 1.
- <sup>67</sup> “Abu Jilda, ‘Bugbear’ of the Police!” *Filastin*, 27 January 1934, p. 1.
- <sup>68</sup> “Hasan Sidqi Bek al-Dajani’s Defense of al-`Armit before the High Court of Appeals,” *al-Difa`*, 30 July 1934, p. 6.
- <sup>69</sup> “Abu Jilda’s ‘Court’ Gives Death Sentence,” *Filastin*, 14 March 1934, p. 5.
- <sup>70</sup> “Abu Jilda Gathers Weapons and Hates Lies,” *Filastin*, 14 March 1934, p. 5; “Abu Jilda’s Generosity,” *Mir`at al-Sharq*, 27 October 1933, p. 5.
- <sup>71</sup> “Abu Jilda Fasts for Ramadan and Demonstrates,” *Filastin*, 19 January 1934, p. 4; “Abu Jilda and His Gang’s Withdrawal in the Mountains,” *Filastin*, 24 January 1934, p. 1.
- <sup>72</sup> “Abu Jilda Emerges from His Seclusion,” *Filastin*, 25 January 1934, p. 5.

<sup>73</sup> “Abu Jilda’s ‘State,’” *Mir’at al-Sharq*, 27 October 1933, p. 5.

<sup>74</sup> Benedict Anderson’s linkage of the development of print-capitalism to the development of nationalism has been one of his key contributions. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2006), chapter 3. On the press and nationalism in Palestine, see: Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1900–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004); Kabha, *Palestinian Press*; and Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), especially chapter 6.

<sup>75</sup> Issues that featured Abu Jilda prominently seem to have sold quite well. See, for example, Kabha, *Palestinian Press*, p. 99; “Abu Jilda and His Wedding,” *Filastin*, 9 December 1933, p. 4; “From Abu Jilda’s Capital!” *Filastin*, 27 January 1934, p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, photographs of Abu Jilda and his gang published in *Filastin* on 1 September 1933 (p. 1), 28 January 1934 (p. 1), and 15 April 1934 (p. 4); see also the poem published by *Filastin* on 8 April 1934, p. 13. For a discussion of public and collective consumption of newspapers among Palestinians, see Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, pp. 103–108, 131–153.

<sup>77</sup> “Abu Jilda! Hero of the Night and of the Day in Palestine,” *Filastin*, 7 February 1934, p. 10.

<sup>78</sup> Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 96.

<sup>79</sup> Harun Hashim Rashid. *Abu Jilda wal-`Armit yama kasarū baranit: Hikaya haqiqiyya min butulat al-muqawama al-sha`biyya al-filastiniyya* (Amman: Dar Majdalawi lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi`, 2007).

<sup>80</sup> Bishara Bendeck Sarioglu, *The Holy Land and the Unholy Trinity: The History of the Lost Country and the Predicament of Its Dispersed People* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse.Com, 2011), pp. 84–86.

<sup>81</sup> See “Projects: The Incidental Insurgents,” last modified 27 June 2013, [www.ibraaz.org/projects/52](http://www.ibraaz.org/projects/52).